Were the Miracles of Jesus invented by the
Disciples/Evangelists?
Updated:
Dec 21, 2002 | Back
to the Miracles Index | Summary
13.
Even if we grant that these miracle stories are meant to be understood
literally, and that these accounts derive ultimately from eyewitness accounts, doesn't the pervasive gullibility of the ancient world
reduce the credibility of these accounts to virtually nil? The countless 'eyewitness testimonies' to
things like centaurs, live births from males, miraculous healings at temples,
teleportation and metamorphoses should render the evidential value of the
gospel 'eyewitness accounts' similarly zero.
A published version of this can be seen from Evan Fales [Philsophia
Christi, Series 2, Volume 2, Number 1, 2001, p. 22): "Perhaps most surprisingly, he [David Clark]
fails to see the evidential force of the concessions he makes in considering
alternative explanations for miracle stories. It is a truism that the fact that
some miracle stories are fabricated is logically consistent with the
possibility that some are true. The issue is evidential: given that so many are fabricated, what reason do we have to believe those of the home
religion?" Fales referred in the preceding paragraph to Richard
Carrier's piece on
Kooks and Quacks of the Roman Empire
(https://infidels.org/library/modern/richard-carrier-kooks/). Carrier will say there: "If the people of that time were so gullible
or credulous or superstitious, then we have to be very cautious when
assessing the reliability of witnesses of Jesus. As Thomas Jefferson believed
when we composed his own version of the gospels, Jesus may have been an
entirely different person than the gospels tell us, since the supernatural and
other facts about him, even some of his parables or moral sayings, could easily
have been added or exaggerated by unreliable witnesses. Thus, this essay is not
about whether Jesus was real or how much of what we are told about him is true.
It is not even about Jesus. Rather, this essay is a warning and a standard, by
which we can assess how likely or easily what we are told about Jesus may be
false or exaggerated, and how little we can trust anyone who claims to be a
witness of what he said and did. For if all of these stories below could be
told and believed, even by Christians themselves, it follows that the gospels,
being of entirely the same kind, can all too easily be inaccurate, tainted by
the gullibility, credulity, or fondness for the spectacular which characterized
virtually everyone of the time." Now, much of modern
scholarship would already disagree with this position, as can
be seen from a couple of authors: And above all, Ramsay MacMullen would
argue that the trend began around 100 AD or so, and yet that even during this
time of increasing 'credulity', Richard's 'virtually all' would be quite in
error: "Plutarch tells
the story (the explanation does not concern us), calling it an instance of
superstition. He uses the word to express his disagreement with those who would
take a perfectly ordinary event, as he saw it, and ascribe divine dimensions to
it. The more a person saw the gods at work in the material world--moving things
around, for instance--and the less a person explained in terms of natural
causes, the clearer was the presence of superstition…Over the course of the
centuries chosen for examination here [100-300], superstition with this meaning
certainly increased. This fact is best sensed (to say 'measured' would
imply a degree of accuracy beyond our reach) in the
greater prominence of magic; for magic, after all, is most shortly
defined as the art that brings about the intervention of superhuman powers in
the material world--'moving things around, for instance." Proof of the
practice of the art grows more abundant, most obviously in recipes and handbooks written on
papyrus. It is to be found in every province, for example, in leaden curse
tablets. And people who should have known better come to credit invocations
with an efficacy that, in some previous century,
would never have been believed. It means nothing that a late orator
attributed an ineffectual speech to hexing by jealous detractors; an early
orator, consul in Cicero's day, offer the same excuse; but when the very
emperor resorted to wizards to aid him in his wars,
times had changed. Perhaps no new ideas are to be discovered, but
old ones are found in circles previously immune
to them…" [HI:PTRE:70] "That was the test: ridicule.
Fully to sense the meaning of Constantine's preposterous pontification, he must
be imagined speaking at Plutarch's table. There, his views would have produced
delighted grins; likewise, no doubt, in the company of Lucian or Apuleius.
Lucian knew of opinionated ignoramuses in very high places indeed, followers of
the pious fraud Alexander. They were the equal in gullibility of the
population of Abonuteichus where Alexander set up shop. Lucian expects his
readers to laugh at them, as Apuleius could hope (a little
anxiously, in a small town like Oea) to raise a laugh at yokel accusations
of magic. He practiced no magic, he insisted in his defense, but scientific
experiment in the tradition of Aristotle. Who but a clod could misinterpret
that? With his trial, we have passed the mid-second
century. We still feel a difference--the
difference between "religion" and "superstition"
--separating the literate few of Athens, Rome, or Carthage from the people of
remote centers like Oea in Tripolitania or Abonuteichus in Pontus. Another hundred years pass, and gullibility is no longer a
target for ridicule. In the most educated circles that the Empire
has to show, enchantments, trances, and wonder-working raise no laugh;
rather, fear and awe. It is rationalism, as we would call it, that now must
defend itself; and it is easily put to rout by Constantine. Most of his
listeners--not all, for such large changes come about very gradually--no doubt
shared his views." [HI:PTRE:72] "We must remind
ourselves, of course, of the spectrum of temperament and the degrees of
exposure to a diversity of ideas, already emphasized. It was not a world in which absolutely everyone trembled
on the edge of believing absolutely anything." [CRE:17] Note that Fales and Carrier are not
arguing that any of the scriptural miracle narratives are actually untrue,
but only that our grounds for believing them (e.g. eyewitnesses) to be
true might be entirely faulty, and indeed,
the "extra evidential weight" normally assigned to eyewitness
testimony might need to be completely removed--given the 'virtually universal'
gullibility of the period. One might also note at the outset
that: There are several issues here that
need to be considered: ………………………………… A.
Some
initial remarks about terminology. There are actually three
separate "events" under discussion here: 1. Creation:
Initial fabrication of an embellishment (of an existing story), or creation of
a de novo miraculous story (e.g., deliberate deceit, error of memory,
literary motive, overactive imagination, psychoactive bagel) 2. Reception:
Hearing such a 'tall tale' and believing it (i.e., credulity,
gullibility, suggestibility) 3. Relay:
Hearing such a 'tall tale' and (believing it or not) transmitting it to others
(re-telling) with or without further embellishment (i.e. "Creation"). Given these
distinctions, one must note that Fales' position is only about "Creation".
He is not arguing anything about 'gullibility' but about 'fabrication' (e.g.,
deceit). This is not actually an issue of gullibility (or at most only
obliquely--as a 'market' for increasing fabrications). His argument is that 'given so many
deceitful claims, why believe formally-analogous claims from even
comrades?' Carrier's article
seems to be somewhat more focused on Reception and Relay, since
he often combines terms like 'ready to believe or exaggerate'. Creation of
bogus elements does enter for Richard, of course, in the Relay Step. These distinctions
may be relevant for us, since when we try to assess 'gullibility' in the
period, we are dealing with Reception (and to some extent , Relay--although
many times 'tall tales' were told mostly for entertainment, as we have
noted earlier in the genre of paradoxography and in the remarks on the
"ghost" in the letter of Pliny). On the other hand, when we try to
assess Fales' argument, we have to focus largely on the 'relative quantity'
of fabrications (and the relevance of those fabrications to the
situation of the gospel stories, of course). So, with this in
mind, let's turn to Richard's examples… Richard divides his
evidence into two categories: (1) Minor and (2) Major. He gives as his minor evidence (of widespread gullibility and
'fondness for the spectacular') the following bits: 1. The
ascription to Paul of divinity in Acts 28.6 2. The
ascription to Paul and Barnabas of divinity in Acts 14.8-18 3. Some
of the messianic claimants discussed in Josephus (i.e., The Egyptian, Jonathan
the Sicarius, Theudas) 4. Simon
Magus in Acts 8.9-11 5. The
speaking of the statue of Tyche--Plutarch 6. Vespasian's
healing (from Suetonius/Tacitus) 7. Statues
at which healing occurred (Lucian, Pausanias…Athenagoras) 8. Asclepius He gives as major
evidence the stories of Apollonius, Peregrinus, and Alexander. Let's take a quick
look at each of these: ·
The ascription to Paul of divinity in Acts
28.6 and to Paul and Barnabas in Acts 14.9ff: The text of Acts
28.6 here reads thus: After we had reached safety, we then learned
that the island was called Malta. 2 The natives showed us unusual kindness.
Since it had begun to rain and was cold, they kindled a fire and welcomed all
of us around it. 3 Paul had gathered a bundle of brushwood and was putting it
on the fire, when a viper, driven out by the heat, fastened itself on his
hand. 4 When the natives saw the creature hanging from his hand, they said
to one another, “This man must be a murderer; though he has escaped from the
sea, justice has not allowed him to live.” 5 He, however, shook off
the creature into the fire and suffered no harm. 6 They were expecting him to swell up or drop dead, but after
they had waited a long time and saw that
nothing unusual had happened to him, they changed their minds and began
to say that he was a god. Richard
comments: "Even in Acts, we get an idea of just how gullible people could
be. Surviving a snake bite was evidently enough for the inhabitants of Malta to
believe that Paul himself was a god…" A couple of
observations about the passage: 1.
This is not a case of fabricating a miracle story at all--it's only about
their interpretation of 'extraordinary evidence'. All
their past experience led them to believe that Paul should have suffered and/or
died, and when their cumulative experience of natural law was extraordinarily
violated--not just 'surviving a snake bite' but showing NO
EFFECTS of a fatally poisonous snakebite whatsoever!--it was perfectly reasonable
from them to come up with some extra-ordinary explanation. 2. To
call Paul a G-R 'god' wasn’t really saying much in those days--the concept was
so watered down that it could be 'voted upon' any rich donor to a city (see the
discussion in mq2.html). 3. The
interesting thing is that they seemed genuinely surprised at the
outcome. They were NOT, therefore, accustomed to seeing or
believing miracles stories at all. This was not in any sense 'gullibility'
at believing a 'tall tale' told to them
(a la Reception). Their interpretation of the miracle
might be faulty, but their belief in the
experienced miracle was not 'gullible' in the least. The text of Acts
14.8ff: In Lystra there was a man sitting who could
not use his feet and had never walked, for he had been crippled from birth. 9 He
listened to Paul as he was speaking. And Paul, looking at him intently and
seeing that he had faith to be healed, 10 said in a loud voice, “Stand upright
on your feet.” And the man sprang up and began to walk. 11 When the crowds saw
what Paul had done, they shouted in the Lycaonian language, “The gods have come
down to us in human form!” 12 Barnabas they called Zeus, and Paul they called
Hermes, because he was the chief speaker. 13 The priest of Zeus, whose temple
was just outside the city, brought oxen and garlands to the gates; he and the
crowds wanted to offer sacrifice. 14 When the apostles Barnabas and Paul heard
of it, they tore their clothes and rushed out into the crowd, shouting, 15
“Friends, why are you doing this? We are mortals just like you, and we bring
you good news, that you should turn from these worthless things to the living
God, who made the heaven and the earth and the sea and all that is in them. 16
In past generations he allowed all the nations to follow their own ways; 17 yet
he has not left himself without a witness in doing good—giving you rains from
heaven and fruitful seasons, and filling you with food and your hearts with
joy.” 18 Even with these words, they scarcely restrained the crowds from
offering sacrifice to them. Richard comments:
"And Paul and his comrade Barnabas had to go to some lengths to convince
the Lycaonians of Lystra that they were not deities -- for the locals
immediately sought to sacrifice to them as manifestations of Hermes and Zeus,
simply because a man with bad feet stood up (14:8-18). These stories show how
ready people were to believe that gods can take on human form and walk among
them, and that a simple show was sufficient to convince them that mere men were
such divine beings. And this evidence is in the bible itself." Some
observations about this passage: 1.
This is not about somebody simply with 'bad feet' (!), but someone
either with a congenital birth defect or having experienced an accident in
infancy (cf. Mephibosheth in the OT). This is an instantaneous healing, which
was rightly interpreted as 'extraordinary evidence'. They were amazed to the
point of having to interpret such an extraordinary experience. 2.
And, again, the "error" is in the interpretation of the
miracle, not in the admission of its reality. It is entirely
reasonable to use para-normal, supra-normal categories to attempt to describe
this. But this narrative data doesn’t really support or
undermine Richard's thesis--it's just irrelevant to his point. But
the literary data in these
passages actually carries some 'bad news' for Richard's thesis. Compare the
comments of commentators on these: ·
"It is not difficult to detect Luke's
quiet humor in his account of their [Acts 28] sudden change of mind.
We may compare and contrast his description of the change of mind among the
native populace of Lystra, who first greeted Paul and Barnabas as gods, and
then stoned Paul nearly to death (14:11-19). Luke
probably implies that only uncultured people like the Lystrans and
the Maltese---"barbarians", as he calls them--would think of Paul as a divine being."
(Bruce, Acts, NICNT) · "Whenever similar stories were told,
those who survived bites from poisonous snakes or lizards were considered holy
men (e.g., the pious Jewish holy man Hanina ben Dosa); Greco-Roman paganism
often considered such holy men to be divine or semidivine. The change of mind on the part of Paul’s viewers could
strike the ancient reader as humorous, as in some similar accounts in antiquity where
a human was mistaken for a particular divinity." [REF:BBC, at Acts 28] and "Like most early Jewish
and Christian writers (cf. also Is 46:5–7), Luke is
not above making fun of paganism’s stupidity."
[REF:BBC, at Acts 14] ·
"The reactions of the local people reflect superstitions of the
day, and are treated by Luke with an ironic humor."
[Hemer, [NT:BASHH:153]] Interesting…Luke
here is actually 'making fun of' their 'interpretive credulity'! It seems that
Luke may be agreeing to a certain extent with Richard, about the pagan response
to miracle. But this creates a
rather serious problem for Richard's position--for Luke is a Christian
writer, and even a writer of one of the Gospels (with the miracle narratives
about Jesus). This would mean that Luke has a
self-conscious distance between his 'belief'
and the 'credulity' of the pagan-world-at-large (as described by
Richard). Luke is accordingly 'sensitive to' the issue of gullibility, and
indeed, is positioned against it (as being in itself 'ludicrous').
This is a major argument against Richard's identification of Christian
acceptance of miracle with Pagan credulity/gullibility. In fact, since
Luke wrote a gospel, this also strikes a major blow against the position
that the gospels are 'entirely the same stuff' as the pagan miracle stories. But there's
more…This literary observation can now be extended to Luke's readership,
for (as BBC noted above) his ancient readers would have found the pagan
response similarly comical. How would Luke know that his readership
would find these ascriptions of divinity as comical as he did? By his knowledge
of literary educational praxis… We have noticed
several times earlier in this series that G-R
education (above basic reading skills)
involved 'debunking' of G-R myth. The students would practice 'debunking
opposing legal counsel' by working over and discrediting stories told in G-R
myth. Anyone who could write above 'merchant level' (and many/most
who wrote only at that level) would
have had practice in 'skeptical' thinking, and almost anyone who
could read (above that level) would have too. Luke could, therefore, presume
upon his readership the knowledge that such 'credulity' was laughable. But notice that
Luke does not portray the miracle itself as ludicrous, but rather as
something 'matter of fact'. Paul shakes the snake off and gets back to work
building the fire--there is no 'speech' or 'oracle' or 'divine manifestation'
at the time. There are no amulets or magical rites. It was just a protective act of Paul's God, with no fanfare or
spectacular adornment. Luke does the same at 14.8--the miracle event is rather
straightforward, without omens, portents, thunder and lightning, incantations,
sacrifices, etc…just a matter-of-fact act of God in helping someone…And Paul
himself does the de-bunking for the populace, explaining to them that
although something extraordinary did happen among them, their elaborate
mythological interpretation of it was simply wrong. There are
miraculous elements throughout Acts, of course, but none of these have the
'trappings' of G-R myth, which would have tipped the reader off that debunking
and discounting were necessary. So, oddly enough,
these first two examples actually do not provide any support for Richard's
thesis of "universal gullibility" (since the people in the stories
were not recipients of miracle stories), and indeed provide evidence against
his assumption that Christian praxis was no different from pagan (at
least at the time/level of NT authorship, I might add). We have positive
literary data that suggests that (some) Christian authors were sensitive to and
opposed to pagan credulity (at least at the interpretive step). We will come back
to this issue later, too… ·
Some of the messianic claimants discussed in
Josephus (i.e., The Egyptian, Jonathan the Sicarius, Theudas) The main problem
with this data is chronological--they are all after the NT
gospel traditions are 'established'. As we discussed in mq7.html,
these figures are too late to the party… When we discussed
several of the alleged parallels to Jesus, we noted that the period immediately
before Jesus was a devoid of any major or patterned miracle claims. None
of the Messianic claimants of the pre-Jesus period made claims to miracles.
There are no literary 'heroes' of the immediate period doing wonderful works.
All the supernatural events of the period are basically oracular/prophetic. We
noted that Theissen had called this one of the most skeptical periods in
Ancient History. However, as soon
as the gospel stories of Jesus get circulated--then miracles by others
start popping up all over! Apollonius gets 'rehabilitated' as a wonderworker
(although it doesn’t actually look like it was intended to be a factual
account--see mq5.html). And these Jewish messianic
claimants all start offering 'a sign' as proof of their messianic status… These post-Jesus
messianic claimants are pre-Destruction (70ad) and therefore are of the
generation that witnessed Jesus' many miracles. Why wouldn't they
be open to the miraculous after that Larger-than-Life Love? As we noted
earlier, there is a high probability (argued by Theissen and others) that the
miracle stories of Jesus--widely and early circulated and argued by Christians
with pagans--created a 'miraculous expectation' that led to an increase in
'actual credulity' of Late Antiquity. We should also
note the 'scale' of this phenomenon, relative to population size--to see to
what extent it might be reflective of 'virtually everyone' (smile)… If we use Gray's
list of Messianic figures in Josephus which offered some kind of sign (not all
did, and none of the pre-Jesus ones did, as noted above), we can get a quick
overview [HI:PFLST, chapter 4]: Name Ref Time Type of figure Locale # of Followers Type of sign Notes Theudas Antq 20.97f 45AD Prophet (like Moses?) Syria-Palestine Small (overcome easily by 500 cavalry) Promise of parting the Jordan We don't know which direction he approached the Jordan
from, so we don’t really know where the followers were from The Egyptian (Jew) War 2.261f; Antq 20.169f 56AD Prophet (like
Joshua) Palestine,
"countryside" and around Jerusalem Uncertain: War: 30,000, most killed or taken prisoner; Antiq: "masses", but only 600 killed or
taken prisoner; [Acts 21.38: 4,000] Promised the walls of Jerusalem would fall down at his
command (but I wonder if this is figurative, since War said
he intended to 'break through by force'?) Contradictions in the accounts (source, size of following) Unnamed figures
under Felix War 2.258f; Antq 20.167f Post-56AD; Pre-60AD Prophet Jerusalem-only Less than the Egyptian 'signs of (political) freedom' Unnamed prophet of
70 CE War 6.283f 70 AD Prophet Jerusalem-only
(during the battle!) 6000 women and children (the men were fighting in the
battle) Promised delivery from the Romans that day Not sure how much 'conviction' versus 'desperation' was
involved here--taking refuge in the Temple, during the middle of the battle,
may have been the ONLY 'reasonable' thing to do! Jonathan the
Sicarius War 7.437f; Life 424f In the 70's, after
the Destruction ? Cyrene (North Africa) 2,000 Signs and apparitions Cyrene was the Roman Capital of the province there. Very large city--220k were said to have
been killed in the Jewish uprising in 115AD, implying a population much, much
larger. Unnamed figure
under Festus Antiq 20.188 60-62CE ? Palestine 'salvation and rest from troubles' (not enough data to study, but the description 'looks
like' a sign-prophet Now, given that
the Jewish*.* population of Syria-Palestine at this time is somewhere in the
1-2M range, even the huge number for the Egyptian (30k) represents only 1.5-3.0
% …and if the number is actually closer to the number in acts (i.e., 4k), it
doesn't even register…The Cyrene case is down in the sub-one percentage
category also… I really don’t
feel comfortable at all extrapolating from these tiny numbers to something like
'virtually everyone'. I can find greater percentages than these in every modern
society of the world. [The recent (2002) legal action in the USA against the
psychic hotline of Miss Cleo involved 6 million callers, out of an adult
population base around 200m--3%.] These ancient examples simply cannot be used
to support the quantitative-aspect claims of Richard's position. (I personally tend
to discount the qualitative aspect as well, since I do not believe that 'acts of
desperation' are in any way representative of 'acts of conviction'…The
modern medical practitioner, whose daughter develops a disease not treatable by
'scientific' medicine, and who in desperation turns to 'alternative' solutions,
does not do so because he has become convinced the cure will work, but does so
in desperation--in grasping at straws however flimsy…it would be a misnomer to call
this 'faith'…and many of the cases above--in the years before the Destruction
(especially during the very battle!) , may well be such 'non-faith' acts of
despair… more on this later…) We should also
note that 'hopefulness' is not the same as 'credulity'. These Sign Prophets are
not said to have actually performed any signs, but only to have promised
them--compare Meier's comment: "It cannot be stressed
too much that when Josephus polemicizes against "false prophets" and "charlatans" like Theudas (Ant.
20.5.1 §97-98) or the unnamed Egyptian (Ant. 20.8.6 § 160-70; cf. J.
W. 2.13.5 §261-62), he presents them as promising the people
signs of deliverance. Shortly before the final storming of Jerusalem a
"false prophet" promises "signs of deliverance" and
persuades many desperate Jews to flee to the temple (J. W. 6.5.2 §285).
Josephus likewise speaks in more general terms of "deceivers," who
enticed people into rebellion by promising them that if they followed them into
the wilderness, there God would show them "the signs of deliverance"
(J W. 2.13.4 §259; cf. Ant. 20.8.6 §167-68). In A.D. 73 a weaver
called Jonathan persuaded the Jews of Cyrene to follow him into the wilderness,
so that there he could show them "signs and apparitions" (J.W.
7.9.1 §437-42). All of these popular leaders, whatever their precise agenda,
are sometimes referred to by scholars as "sign prophets." In one
sense that is correct, since they all promise "signs" or the
equivalent thereof. But the phrase "sign prophets" can easily lead
the unwary reader astray. Josephus never says that any of these
"deceivers" actually performed miracles. Strictly speaking, they
do not belong under the rubric of "miracle-worker...Thus, Jesus of
Nazareth stands out as a relative exception in The Antiquities in that
he is a named figure in 1st-century Jewish Palestine to whom Josephus is
willing to attribute a number of miraculous deeds (Ant. 18.3.3 §63).
" [MJ:2:592] So at least this
data deals with post-Jesus 'credulity' at best, and certainly
doesn't support Richard's claims to ubiquity. ·
Simon Magus in Acts 8.9-11 Acts 8 reads as
follows (NRSV): Now those who
were scattered went from place to place, proclaiming the word. 5 Philip went
down to the ("a") city of Samaria and proclaimed the Messiah
to them. 6 The crowds with one accord listened eagerly to what was said by
Philip, hearing and seeing the signs that he did, 7 for unclean spirits, crying
with loud shrieks, came out of many who were possessed; and many others who
were paralyzed or lame were cured. 8 So there was great joy in that city. 9 Now
a certain man named Simon had previously practiced
magic in the city and amazed the people
of Samaria, saying that he was someone great. 10 All of them, from the
least to the greatest, listened to him eagerly, saying, “This man is the
power of God that is called Great.” 11 And they listened eagerly to him
because for a long time he had amazed them with his
magic. 12 But when they believed Philip, who was proclaiming the
good news about the kingdom of God and the name of Jesus Christ, they were
baptized, both men and women. 13 Even Simon himself believed. After being
baptized, he stayed constantly with Philip and was amazed when he saw the signs
and great miracles that took place. Notes: 1.
We don’t know where this 'city' is, but we know where it is NOT. It is not
the capital Sebaste, since that is a Greek city (not Samaritan), and it is not
Neapolis (built near their holy site Mt. Gerizim) which wasn’t founded until 72
ad. It MIGHT be Sychar (of John 4 fame), but we don’t know, and the encounter
in John 4 didn’t manifest any 'magical tendencies' in that part of Samaria
(suggesting that our case here is not necessarily representative of 'all
Samaritans' by any means). In any event, there are no 'large cities left' after
these two--in Samaria, and so the 'population base' for this incident is very,
very small. 2.
Whatever he did to 'amaze' the populace was obviously dwarfed by
the healing and exorcisms done by Philip. This introduces an interesting
dimension to this story. If Simon is impressed
by the relative difference between the miracles of Philip and his own
(low-grade versus high-grade miracles), then the people of this city have
been 'amazed' at low-grade miracles. BUT THIS MEANS that they were
obviously not 'anesthetized by familiarity' to low-grade miracles. In other words,
low-grade miracles were rare enough in their experience to bear evidential force.
This needs to be seen clearly. If the world of the time was literally filled
with (a) events seen as miracles; and (b) claims about miracles being believed
wholesale; then the low-grade miracles of Simon should have been very un-amazing…This
argues the opposite of Richard's position here, obviously. 3. Notice
that it never actually says that Simon did anything miraculous.
It only says that they were "amazed" at him, because of his magic
practice. If you remember from our discussion of magic in mq6.html: "Of the
540-odd tablets listed in the Greek Magical Papyri ([NT:GMPIT]), a mere 68 (12.6%) of them have any
relationship to healing-type miracles. And of these 68, a full 40 deal with
headache, fever, stings and bites, coughs, and eye problems. Most spells are
largely of the 'attack/counter-attack/preclude attack' types (apart from the
'coerced love' spells, of course)." I should point out that 'amazement'
can be generated as easily by showmanship as by results--as the
clever architectural designs of some of the Mithraic worship-centers [HI:PTRE:126] (and even Medieval church
buildings) illustrate. At any rate, the
data is once again unsupportive of massive gullibility, and indeed suggests
that miracle claims were not even remotely 'a dime a dozen' in this period. ·
The speaking of the statue of
Tyche--Plutarch. Richard makes a
factual error in introducing this case, with his "Miracles were also a
dime a dozen in this era." We
noted at the beginning of this article (and the reader is encouraged to also
see the historical data in mq6.html) that miracle claims were exceptionally rare in this period
(with the major exception of divination--only partially miraculous, and not on
a par with the kinds of miracles under discussion). This is a serious weakness
in Richard's position, unfortunately, since his position would predict quite
the opposite. We should see reams and reams of literature debunking (or
endorsing) these paranormal events --but we don’t until after
Jesus' miracles are widely known. We do get the occasional treatise
against magical medicine (a la Galen and Pliny), but nothing against
really 'big' miracle claims. And, needless to say, Richard cannot argue from
this single example of Plutarch to some kind of 'dime a dozen' scope of
conclusion!…But on to Plutarch… Unfortunately,
Plutarch is another bad example. Not only is he post-Jesus (writing after
96AD), but he is also part of the 'growing credulity' trend. [One of our
opening quotes pointed this out, although the quote mentioned that it was
somewhat restrained in his writings.]. In fact, in this passage, after
explaining that many non-verbal 'signs' can be given by gods
through statues, Plutarch goes on to argue that God could still communicate
supra-sensually (miraculously) to communicate messages to the faithful, and he
never actually "explains away" the speaking statue (contra
the implication of Richard), but refers it to the direct action of a god upon
the mind of the faithful. Look at the text: "The senate,
much commending their public spirit, caused the temple to be built and a statue
set up in it at the public charge; they, however, made up a sum among
themselves for a second image of Fortune, which the Romans say uttered, as it
was putting up, words to this effect, "Blessed of the gods, O women, is
your gift." "These words,
they profess, were repeated a second time, expecting our belief of what seems
pretty nearly an impossibility. It may be possible enough that statues may seem
to sweat, and to run with tears, and to stand with certain dewy drops of a
sanguine colour; for timber and stones are frequently known to contract a kind
of scurf and rottenness, productive of moisture; and various tints may form on
the surfaces, both from within and from the action of the air outside; and by
these signs it is not absurd to imagine that the deity may forewarn us. It may
happen, also, that images and statues may sometimes make a noise not unlike
that of a moan or groan, through a rupture or violent internal separation of
the parts; but that an articulate voice, and such express words, and language
so clear and exact and elaborate, should proceed from inanimate things is, in
my judgment, a thing utterly out of possibility. For
it was never known that either the soul of man, or the deity himself,
uttered vocal sounds and language, alone, without an organized body and members
fitted for speech. But where history seems in a manner to force our assent by
the concurrence of numerous and credible witnesses, we are to conclude that
an impression distinct from sensation affects the
imaginative part of our nature, and then carries away the judgment,
so as to believe it to be a sensation; just as in sleep we fancy we see and
hear, without really doing either. Persons, however, whose strong feelings of
reverence to the deity, and tenderness for religion, will not allow them to
deny or invalidate anything of this kind, have certainly a strong argument
for their faith, in the wonderful and transcendent character of the divine
power; which admits no manner of comparison with ours, either in its nature
or its action, the modes or the strength of its operations. It is no contradiction to reason that it should do things
that we cannot do, and effect what for us is impracticable:
differing from us in all respects, in its acts yet more than in other points we
may well believe it to be unlike us and remote from us. Knowledge of divine things for the most part, as Heraclitus
says, is lost to us by incredulity." Regardless of the
understanding of this passage, though, there is no way to extrapolate from this
to some 'dime a dozen' hypothesis, since Plutarch does not indicate in any way
how widespread the 'speaking statue' incident reports are, nor does his
argumentation in the passage require it to be large at all. In other words, a
single notable example would be adequate cause for such a passage--there is no
way of knowing whether he is responding to a claim of extraordinary quality
or a claim representative of extraordinary quantity. Richard will need
to look elsewhere to back up his claim. ·
Vespasian's healing (from Suetonius/Tacitus) We have
already discussed this case in mq2.html, along with the
general theme of 'divine leaders'. Even if it were "true", it was so unique
of a situation that it could hardly be used to support a "Miraculous
healings were also commonplace" conclusion. ·
Statues at which healing occurred (Lucian,
Pausanias…Athenagoras) Now, when we come
to the healing statues, Richard is certainly on better 'quantitative'
grounds. We do have mentions of shrines and temples and statues at which
healing was supposed to have occurred. MacMullen can say: "Those
particular shrines (Asclepieia) were very numerous and, if all other places of
resort for healing were counted in as well, drew to themselves more
supplicants than any competing category of belief. What could be found
there? Dreams and health. The chief business of religion, it might then be
said, was to make the sick well." [HI:PTRE:49] But we now have
the problem of the qualitative aspect--did those who sought
healing at a statue or shrine really 'believe' anything? Remember,
"credulity" is about "belief"--not 'experimental behavior'.
We noted in mq6.html
that a healing transaction was a 'quid pro quo' transaction (Kee's
phrase), and that the sick would try one deity, then another, then another
(i.e., Aelius Aristides) --until they got results, ran out of resources, gave
up, or perished. There was generally no 'belief' required, and no
post-healing 'commitment'. MacMullen
can express this, and still hold up cases of 'sincerity': "More
proof of this sincerity (of prayers to deities) appears in plague times, when
city senates tried to enlist the direct help, or at least the advice, of some
god in their salvation. Again, we ourselves may be skeptical. In desperation, any measure might be tried, however little
credited. Yet some of our inscriptions, to say nothing of
Aristides' report on his private efforts, declare after the event that
salvation (healing) had been really won by prayer: plagues or earthquakes had
been ended, unspecified benefits bestowed, the Goths scatter. That partnership,
mutually respectful, between the powers above and the leadership below, was
seen actually to work." [HI:PTRE:59] The data about
religious commitment in paganism of the period is just too contradictory
to assume that belief was a core element. For example: "…the
same ardent Romans who burnt the 'atheist' Justin should, in Juvenal's
day, have laughed at anyone professing faith in an altar or temple."
[HI:PTRE:62] The inscriptions
describing the healing were written by the paid priests in the temple, who also
published the various stellae and inscriptions proclaiming the wonders
of their patron deity. However, it did not involve belief (as would be assumed
under the topic of 'credulity'): "But such
activity (stellae) represented no system of beliefs; it sought to change no one's life; and it quite
took for granted, and assumed that listeners likewise took for granted, the
true divinity of the god advertised. It focused rather on the attractions to
be had at the shrine: healing, foreknowledge, or a feast." [HI:PTRE:98] In the cases
mentioned by Richard, we do not have any indication of how many healing
stories were 'recorded' there, but unless they were significantly
more successful than Asclepius (below), there could not have been many.
But the reference
to Athenagorus is really interesting, for here again we have a Christian discounting credulity! One
can see it in the word choices in the passage: "The one has
statues of Neryllinus, a man of our own times; and Parium of Alexander and
Proteus: both the sepulchre and the statue of Alexander are still in the forum.
The other statues of Neryllinus, then, are a public ornament, if indeed a city
can be adorned by such objects as these; but one of them is supposed to utter oracles and to heal the
sick, and on this account the people of the Troad offer sacrifices to this
statue, and overlay it with gold, and hang chaplets upon it. But of the statues
of Alexander and Proteus (the latter, you are aware, threw himself into the
fire near Olympia), that of Proteus is likewise
said to utter oracles; and to that of Alexander…sacrifices are offered and festivals are held
at the public cost, as to a god who can hear.
Is it, then, Neryllinus, and Proteus, and Alexander who exert these energies in
connection with the statues, or is it the nature of the matter itself? But the
matter is brass. And what can brass do of itself, which may be made again into
a different form, as Amasis treated the footpan, as told by Herodotus? And
Neryllinus, and Proteus, and Alexander, what good are they to the sick? For
what the image is said now to effect, it effected when Neryllinus was
alive and sick." This, again,
suggests that whatever level of gullibility we assign to the pagan world
on the basis of Richard's data, that level does NOT apply to the Christian
group. And accordingly, no discounting of
reliability of the Christian testimony is warranted on the basis of Richard's
data (even if taken at face value). MacMullen offers
interesting confirmation of this. He has this passage in [CRE:8]: "What is likely first
to attract notice are the blunt words of contempt and disapproval with which
the lettered aristocracy, in talking about religious views, belabor the simple,
unthinking, ordinary folk, the unlearned." But when he footnotes
this 'disapproval of common credulity', his ancient sources are Tertullian,
Ireneaus, Minicus Felix, Lucian, Athenagorus, Eusebius, and Porphyry.
More than half of these are Christian… ·
Asclepius Asclepius is called
the 'above all' by Richard, and used to support his argument that healing tales
were 'not remarkable at all'. Now, I have
discussed Asclepius at length in mq6.html,
but let me point out how 'small' the scope is even here: "The
Epidaurian Temple Record is a list of cures, and of miracles going further than
cures, which took place there…Most of the
recorded cures are no more than cures, which might be put down to
natural causes, or to skilful treatment by the priest. Others, such as the
disappearance of the spear-point and the transfer of Pandarus's mark, at least
seem miraculous, and the latter has a moral as well. The record shows that the miracles were few, and even the simple cures were not numerous. There were enough to sustain hope
and faith, and to attract funds for maintenance. But obviously, if the priest
had been able to improve Asclepius's score themselves, or even pretend to
have done so in the past, the number claimed would
have been greater. It was clearly understood--too clearly to
leave room for major deception--that beyond a certain point, human agency
had no power in the matter. If Asclepius chose to work a miracle, then he
would, but it was the god's doing and he did not often choose." [Miracles,
Geoffrey Ashe, RoutledgeKeganPaul:1978, p.18,19] I might also make
a comment about the 'more reliable evidence than anything we have for the
miracles of Jesus' remark: it's just not true (smile). From a historiography
standpoint, multiple textual witnesses (especially non-collusive ones), of much
longer length than epigraphic mini-texts, without clearly defined literary
exemplars and social 'pressures' (i.e., temples had 'template' documents and
expectations--like many modern day 'healing' events), and written/transmitted
by an original checks-and-balances group (as opposed to a 'testimony' written by
a priest after the cured had left…e.g., we KNOW of forged testimonies in such
temples) is a much more reliable base to work from… So, at the end of the minor
evidence section, we don't really have any scope-data: we cannot tell how
pervasive these beliefs are, nor can we be very sure they really ARE 'beliefs',
nor do most/many of them even fall into the pre-NT-writing period. At best,
they witness to a pan-cultural belief in the supernatural, and some of the data
(e.g. Acts/Luke, Athenagorus) actually differentiates the credulity of the lower-level pagans from the Christian
position anyway…This data would actually support the view that the NT
authors did not 'follow cunningly devised fables' in the writing of the
canonical NT documents. …………………………………………………………….. On to the Major evidence… In this section, Richard describes
certain aspects of the traditions about Apollonius, Peregrinus, and Alexander.
This piece is dated in 1997, and I strongly suspect that Richard would have
written this differently had it been more recent. Several observations are in order
about this material: "A more
difficult question than the dating is that of Peregrinus'
history and personality. For most of his career the only witness is Lucian,
who is obviously not concerned to give a sober
account." (p.120) "Though
evidence from elsewhere can be used to correct, confirm or supplement Lucian,
particularly in what he says of Glycon, for an
account of Alexander's career he is the inescapable, if heavily biased, source."
(p.134) "The belief in
curative statues flourished as vigorously in the second century as the
belief in magic." (Jones, p.49) "It
was in this period that Platonists and Pythagoreans began to import
into philosophy the demonology and the oriental lore that were so strongly to
color later Greek thought." (Jones, p.51) "Another Platonist of
the same epoch is Apuleius of Madaura, who was accused of using the black arts
himself, and whose Metamorphoses contain incidents of magic and the
supernatural that often recall Lucian. Apuleius leaves his reader uncertain
whether to understand his story as fantasy or autobiography, and it is likely
that other philosophers were similarly evasive." (Jones, p.51) "Just
as Lucian's ostensible date has been suspected [On Writing History], so
also have his depictions of contemporary historians, the accusation being
that their errors or absurdities are so gross that they seem more like
caricatures than real people. Lucian claims to take his examples from
recitations which he had attended personally and solemnly assures the reader of
his veracity. But though he avoids invention, he is
free to choose the most grotesque targets that he could find, while
modern readers are used to works that have survived the sifting of ancient and
medieval critics. In some instances, moreover, history helps to verify his
claim to truth [about his grotesque targets]." (Jones, p.60f) "Many of these
charges [in Mistaken Critic] are familiar, and Lucian may not have
intended them all to be believed. " (p.111) "The statue there was
believed to give oracles and to heal the sick, and this confirms another of
Lucian's predictions: that Peregrinus would be supposed to cure his devotees of
quartan fever . All this is well within the bounds of ordinary belief. Statues
were thought to be invested with all kinds of numinous power, but
particularly with the cure of fevers, a belief mocked by Lucian elsewhere
." (Jones, p.130) "Peregrinus and his followers
seem to have been far less successful than other religious innovators like
Alexander, and though his memory lived on for centuries the cult is only
mentioned within a few years of his death. This
hybrid of Cynicism and popular religions was perhaps too monstrous to survive."
(Jones, p.130) "The connection with
Apollonios and with Pythagoreanism brought Alexander's oracle directly into the
philosophic debates of the day, in which the reputations of Apollonios
and Pythagoras, and the reliability or oracles, were hotly contested,
and Lucian's essay can be understood partly as a volley in such an
intellectual battle." (Jones, p.135) "The question whether
Alexander was "really" fraudulent or sincere is unanswerable, and
perhaps beside the point . Nature had given him charismatic qualities and set
him in an age thirsting for oracles and cures. But it was also an age of
intense controversy, which could produce a Lucian no less than an Alexander.
It is clear that Lucian's pamphlet would have been
seen as an example of a familiar type, the literature of exposure."
(Jones, p.148; note, 'intense controversy' not 'intense credulity') Let's summarize some of these points
about Richard's article (and the implications of the data we have found): Overall, what this means is that the
conclusion in the article is unwarranted. The data briefly given by Richard
does NOT warrant some mass-suggestibility attribution to the pre-Jesus world at
large, and indeed, offers a good deal of support against such a
view. (We will come back to some of these themes as we get into the next
section of this article.) ……………………………………………………………………. C.
Methodological issues involved in assessing ancient gullibility One.
One of the first problems concerns the target group. We have noted that pagan
and Christian writers BOTH accused the common folk of 'rampant credulity'--at
least in the post Jesus period--but is this
"common folk" the relevant group for our question? Since
Richard (for example) and our own series here is focused on the New Testament
authors, originators, and leaders, gullibility of other groups not
represented by the NT authors is completely
irrelevant to the issue. For example, to
argue from the gullibility of children to the gullibility of university
professors is absurd. To argue from the supposed gullibility of a majority of an
uneducated, illiterate group to the supposed gullibility of an educated, literary
group (and even a group that differentiates itself explicitly
from these 'hoi polloi'!) is equally mistaken. So, our real task
should be to identify the salient 'gullibility indications' of the social
group in which the NT authors (and/or Jesus tradition transmitters) were
situated. All discussion of the credulity of other groups is irrelevant to
our question. [It is of great significance, though, to discussions of the
growth and profile of the post-NT church, but this is not our question
here.] Two.
We have a challenge in even defining 'gullibility', 'credulity', and
'suggestibility' in these contexts. Consider some of the problems in
interpreting evidence as evidence of
'belief', 'credulity', and 'other': 2.1
Many actions might be indicative of something other
than belief: Belief versus amazement.
I personally can be 'amazed' and 'mystified' at the feats of skilled performing
magicians today, but this doesn't mean I believe the supernatural had anything
to do with it. In the ancient world, this phenomena is visible in 'simple flash
sorcery' and in the built-for-awe-effects of Mithraic temples and grottos. Belief versus desperation.
We noticed this might have been the case in the ancient healing-seekers
frequently, and certainly shows up in today's alternative medicine praxis. Belief versus hopefulness.
This was likely present in some of the messianic movements (Jewish and
non-Jewish). Some would have followed the messiahs into the wilderness (or into
battle, in non-Jewish movements) without actually believing in the 'miraculous
promise' of the founder. Just because they agreed with the figure enough to
follow/support/endorse them, does not necessarily entail a belief in ALL their
claims. No doubt some of them planned to 'return to real life' if the promised
sign did not actually materialize…"Calculated belief…"? Belief versus 'hedging
bets'. Many of the Roman elite were accorded priesthoods in some local
religion, and often these individuals would also adopt additional
priesthood 'status' with other deities. Although much of this would be
ceremonial and titular only (and not representative of belief structures), in
some cases it might easily fall into the category of 'hedging bets'--adopting
more than one patron deity, 'just in case' one or more of the deities were
inadequate for some given task or need. Belief versus social
praxis. The social world of the populace at large revolved around the
religious festivals and events. These constituted the 'cultural calendar' and
everybody participated in them--whether they believed in Santa Claus or the
Easter Bunny or not…Festivals were simply 'there' and what religion might be
associated with that celebration at any given moment was almost immaterial to
the popular practice. So, when Christianity came to power and had to 'convert'
the entire culture (!), the festivals were sometimes simply 'renamed' and the
statues 'renamed' and all went on as it had before…There was no real 'belief'
attached to these by the populace necessarily. Belief versus asserting
psychological control. In the
case of magic, this is a very real issue, for the modern understanding of magic
ritual now includes the socio-psychological effects of 'sense of control'.
Consider two statements by scholars in the field: "Did They
Work? Until recently, the very idea of asking such a question would have seemed
absurd. Of course this stuff doesn't work! Indeed, from the time of Sir James
Frazer to the present, the ruling assumption has been that spells, charms, and
amulets cannot work--by definition. Once again, the initial assumption sets the
agenda for the ensuing discussion and interpretation: because the beliefs are
assumed to be false and because the practices are taken to be ineffective, how
are we to explain the persistent irrationality of those who pursued them
through so many centuries…What would happen, however, if we changed our initial
assumption and began with the idea that these beliefs and practices must have
worked in some sense; if we indicated that we can no longer accept the
notion that those who hold to them are irrational; and if we recovered our
sense of poetic language and expressive ritual as fundamental constituents of
all human experience? … Roger Tomlin's introduction to the Bath tablets may be
taken as a measure of a new climate regarding the treatment of the
effectiveness of ancient spells and curses. "Did the Bath tablets
work?" he asks. And answers, "the practice of inscribing them for two
centuries ... implies that they did work. Or rather that they were believed
to work; and perhaps, that this belief was justified."' Of course, we
need not assume that they worked in the same way that the participants
themselves believed. But neither are we justified in imposing simplistic or
literalistic preconceptions on these participants and their beliefs. Tomlin
offers several useful insights as to how the tablets might have worked. The
process "removed intolerable tensions." It "allowed a transfer
of emotion." More pragmatically, he continues, "to inscribe a curse
tablet and throw it into the sacred pool relieved the injured party's feelings;
something at least had been done." [HI:CTBSAW:22f]
And "Despite
all these changes, there has always been an unbroken tradition of magic. Why is
magic so irrepressible and ineradicable, if it is also true that its claims and
promises never come true? Or do they? Do people never check up on the
efficiency of magicians?…The answer appears to be that, in general, people
are not interested in whether or not magicians' promises come true. People
want to believe, so they simply ignore their suspicions that magic may all be
deception and fraud. The enormous role deception plays in human life and
society is well known to us." In many crucial areas and in many
critical situations of life, deception is the only method that really
works. As the Roman aphorism sums It up, "Mundus vult decipi, ergo
decipiatur" ("The world wishes to be deceived, and so it may be
deceived"). To an immeasurable extent, people's lives carry on by what
they decide they want to believe rather than by what they should believe or
even know, by what appears to be real rather than by what is really real, by
props and by fads, and by gobbledygook of this kind today and that kind
tomorrow…Magicians are those who have long ago explored these dimensions of the
human mind. Rather than decrying the facts, they have exploited them. Magicians
have known all along that people's religious need and expectations provide the
greatest opportunity for the most effective of all deceptions. But instead of
turning against religion, as the skeptics among the Greek and Roman
philosophers did, the magicians made use of it. After
all, magic is nothing but the art of making people believe that something is
being done about those things in life about which we all know that we ourselves
can do nothing…Magic is the art that makes people who practice it
feel better rather than worse, that provides the illusion of security to the
insecure, the feeling of help to the helpless, and the comfort of hope to the
hopeless…Of course, it is all deception. But who can endure naked reality,
especially when there is a way to avoid it? This is why magic has worked and
continues to work, no matter what the evidence may be. Those whose lives
depend on deception and delusion and those who provide them have formed a truly
indissoluble symbiosis. Magic makes an
unmanageable life manageable for those who believe in it, and a
profession profitable for those who practice the art." [NT:GMPIT:xlviii] What this means is
that many 'believers of magic' may have been 'deliberately
credulous' instead of merely 'credulously credulous' (smile). If I deceive myself
into believing a 'juicy rationalization' to get through the week, is that
the same thing as when someone truly convinces me that these
"fat-coating" diet pills will truly remove the fat from the
double-cheeseburger I just ate? The mere fact that I "know better" but
avoid the truth is a completely different case that when I do not
"know better". How much of ancient magic was the latter and how much
the former is indeterminable from our sources. [Others point out that
magic was attractive to the non-elites because it was illicit--it was a
form of taking action without being dependent on the state or elite-sanctioned
'methods'.] This point might indeed render most/all magic to
be cases of 'non-credulity' (as in 'the suspension of true belief'),
and therefore outside of our question. 2.2 We might also differentiate between belief
in a given supernatural event and belief in supernatural realities. Plutarch, for
example, illustrates that one can be skeptical about 'odd events' and yet still
believe in gods and supernatural intervention (e.g., through impressions formed
on the minds of devotees). And many of the ancient skeptics will show the same
'range of belief', more or less. In modern settings,
one might note that many western medical practitioners are Theists, but also
that they tend to 'suspect' claims of miraculous intervention in practice.
Similarly, we might note the growing 'openness' by field anthropologists toward
the spiritual 'worlds' of their subjects (discussed in eyesopen.html). 2.3
There is a huge difference between belief (as an attitude) and
belief (as internalized, behavioral goals). In the recent
research on automaticity, I noted that the
difference between a 'professor' and a 'possessor' of a deep-belief could be
detected/revealed via psychological testing. Gollwitzer, for example,
differentiated between egalitarian 'attitude-espousers' and those with 'chronic
egalitarian goals' by the absence or presence of post-inconsistency
'over-correction'. When a goal-holder ('true believer') was forced/manipulated
into violating that belief, subsequent 'trials' resulted in
over-correction. When a 'weak professor' was forced/manipulated into
violating that belief, subsequent 'trials' show no evidence of
'over-correction'. This might apply in
our case to those under pressure to adopt or abandon a true-belief. How many
succumbed to the pressure to 'convert' and then later overcorrected, for
example? 2.4 There is clearly a distinction between
belief in miracles and belief in the absurd (in our
period). We have noted
earlier that the educational process of the period facilitated 'rejection' of
the absurd, and we also noted that the presence of the literary genre of paradoxography
(as the tabloids of the past) revealed that people 'enjoyed' the absurd, but
didn’t take it too seriously… 2.5 We should also note the difference between
unconsciously acquired beliefs and consciously adopted
beliefs. One of the
functions of culture is to create a set of unconsciously-agreed-upon
assumptions among residents. The belief system of a culture works on the basis
of assumptions, not articulations. "Once
thoroughly embedded in a culture, belief systems tend for the most part to
reside at the level of assumptions and presuppositions rather than at
the level of constructed explanations. This is one of their most salient
characteristics…Churches often illustrate this pattern. While theological
experts may know the specific dogmas and doctrines that justify and validate
rites, ceremonies, moral requirements, and ascetical practices, the laity in
general can participate fully and meaningfully in the religion without being able to produce satisfactory
explanations for many of their religions actions." [NS:ECA:1, p.125] "Belief
systems are rarely articulated systematically by
the majority of informants because such systems thrive at the level of
assumption." [NS:ECA:1, p.127] Examples of
'unexamined assumptions' in the Western worldview can be readily adduced: "Underlying every
culture are basic assumptions about the nature of things. Someone who questions
worldview assumptions is seen, not as wrong, but as foolish. For example, in
the West if we were to argue that freedom is not inherently good for a society,
people would not take us seriously. These assumptions are the lenses
through which we view the world. " [WR:ARMI:218] "Repugnance
divulges the violation of a somatic taboo or the desecration of the sacred.
An American, for instance, might not be able to
explain why superfluous stray domestic cats are not fed to the poor in
soup kitchens, but facial expressions at such a
suggestion offer incontrovertible evidence that such a practice would be
well beyond the pale." [NS:ECA:1,128] Consciously-adopted
beliefs, on the other hand, often/generally requires explicit
argumentation and explanation. A 'change of belief system' often is simply the
adoption of a 'conscious' belief--over the "top of" a set of
assumptions--rather than the outcome of a 'duel' between rival, competing,
explicit belief systems. Cognitive psychology often points out that it takes much
more/better data to cause 'conversion' than to strengthen the existing
belief structure. Corrigibility of belief is not 'natural'--it requires
'extraordinary' evidence (or at least strong 'other reasons'--needs for
acceptance, self-credibility, etc.). In other
words, conversion from the "house religion" may not be
conversion from a 'true belief system' at all. The abandoned belief
might be a simple unconsciously-acquired one, and the new belief system be a
consciously-adopted one. If first-century
pagans did some ritual due to the 'default' worldview, it would be
methodologically tenuous to assume they believed anything--at the level
we are speaking here in this discussion of 'credulity'. 2.6 We also have the problem of how
seriously/literally magical language was meant to be taken? Since
magical-talk is the closest thing we have to a candidate for 'ubiquity', how
the curse-formulas were understood is a major issue. Did they really, really
indicate a belief in magic by their users? Consider this point by Gager, and
the telling anecdote at the end: "But
how are we to take these "wishes" [for death, sickness, etc] and
who is the real audience of the invocations? Once again, the tendency among
interpreters has been to read them literally. Here we might begin with our
own forms of cursing. What do we mean when we blurt out, "Screw
you!"? Is this an expression of our desire for sexual intercourse? When we
hear teammates or sports fans shout, "Kill the bum!", do we load our
rifles? Two considerations seem in order here. First, the audience may not
be exclusively, or even primarily, "out there." As Tambiah, among
others, has argued, spells are directed primarily to the human participants in
all ritual action. Second, the function of verbal speech-forms represents a
unique feature of human language, namely, its ability to communicate and give
form to the expressive and metaphorical aspects of human experience. We take
this treatment of language for granted when we read poetry or novels. Perhaps
we should apply it to the language of spells and curses. One is reminded of
an anecdote told by Mary Douglas: "Once when a band of !Xung Bushmen had
performed their rain rituals, a small cloud appeared on the horizon, grew and
darkened. Then rain fell. But the anthropologists who
asked if the Bushmen reckoned the rite had produced the rain, were laughed out of court.... How naive can we get about the beliefs of others?'"
[HI:CTBSAW:22] 2.7 If 2.6 was about the language of the users,
this point is about the language of the abusers: it is difficult
sometimes to determine if accusations of 'magic' are indeed accusations of
'sorcery-type' behavior. In some cases, it may simply be accusations of
'foreign wisdom' (unsanctioned by the elite). Pagans, Jews, and
post-NT Christians all accused one another of 'credulity' and 'superstition'.
But it is not always clear how well-informed the ascriptions are. For example,
Janowitz can point out that "Christian and Greco-Roman writers denounced as magic Jewish practices of fasting,
food restrictions and Sabbath observance…Jews and Christians
condemned 'pagan' rituals as magic." [HI:MRW:16f].
These would hardly fall into the category of
'miraculous events'! Accordingly, denunciations of some group as 'doing
magical things' cannot be assumed to refer to the performance of NT-class
miracles! 2.8 There also seems to be no inherent relationship between a general belief in
paranormal realities and credulity toward individual testamentary claims.
In other words, just because someone might believe in magic, is not in any way
correlated with their acceptance of magical claims by an alleged practitioner.
They might believe in all types of supernatural entities yet not believe the
claims of someone alleging to have seen/experienced such supernatural entities.
Belief in a supernatural 'realm' does not imply credulity toward individual
messages and/or messengers about that 'realm'. This can be seen from
field studies in anthropology. Evans-Pritchard, for example, studied the
widespread belief in witchcraft among the Azande tribe. But he was
surprised at the skepticism concerning individual 'supernatural claimants': "I
was surprised to find a considerable body of skeptical opinion in many departments of Zande culture, and especially in regard to their witch-doctors.
Some men are less credulous than others and more critical in their acceptance
of statements made by witch-doctors…Many
people say that the great majority of
witch-doctors are liars whose sole concern is to acquire wealth. I
found that it was quite a normal belief
among Azande that many of the
practitioners are charlatans who make up any reply which they think will please
their questioner, and whose sole inspiration is love of gain." [cited at
[HI:MRE:17]] This skepticism
about specific claims, however, is not
matched by a general skepticism about the phenomena: "Evans-Pritchard,
for instance, emphasized that although many
Azande suspect individual witchdoctors
of being frauds, there is no skepticism about
witchdoctorhood in general: 'I particularly do not wish to give the
impression that there is any one who disbelieves in witch-doctorhood. Most of my acquaintances believed that there are
a few entirely reliable practitioners, but that
the majority are quacks.' He observed that 'faith and skepticism are
alike traditional. Skepticism explains failures of witch-doctors, and being
directed towards particular witch-doctors even tends to support faith in
others.'" [HI:MRE:18] What this would
suggest--especially given the context of a 'superstitious culture'--is that the
gospel claims of miracles by Jesus would not have been believed simply
because people had a general belief in the miraculous. [This, of course,
would make Richard's argument irrelevant to the discussion--he could not
successfully argue from 'general credulity' to 'specific
credulity'.] Thus, acceptance of the gospel stories could not be 'passed off'
as being due to some generalized 'credulity' about some supernatural worldview.
The two items--(1) belief that miracles could occur and (2) the belief that the
specific claims by the evangelists that Jesus performed miracles--cannot be assumed to be causally related. And oddly, this
might suggest the opposite/inverse relationship: the wider the belief in the
paranormal, the more extensive the skepticism concerning individual paranormal
claims. After all, all those among the Azande believed in witchcraft, and (hence?)
there were many claimants, but "even these" pre-literates disbelieved
the majority of the claimants. Now, when we look at the data of
the period through the lenses of the above, much of our 'miracle evidence'
evaporates. In 2.1,
most of the 'data' for 'ubiquitous credulity' disappears at this step. The two
main categories of 'odd-events' in our pre-NT period are magic and healings-at-shrines
(Remember, exorcism was not a widespread/central pagan concept in pre-NT times
[the first use of the term occurs in 2nd-century AD Lucian!], and
'oracles' are not the subject of our series.). "Pliny
distinguishes between two ways of healing--medicina, true medicine, and magia,
the false and arrogant medicine…it is characteristic for Pliny that in other
parts of his work he recommends magorum remedia, in case all other remedies should fail." [HI:MIAW:50] "Finally,
among physicians, even the most empirical found themselves unable, or
unwilling, to break entirely with a system that seemed to work. The noted
physician Galen, for instance, prescribed the use of amulets, even while denying traditional explanations for their
success." [HI:CTBSAW:221] For 2.2, we can note that the vast
skeptical literature of the day (well known by Richard) shows that belief in
the supernatural 'dimension' was NOT the same as 'credulity concerning the
absurd'. Examples such as Plutarch, Galen, Pliny, Pausanias, Porphyry, and even
Celsus reminds us that skepticism concerning specific "outlandish"
events need not imply harsh materialistic atheism. And we noted that
accusations of 'credulity' are exceptionally relative--what counts as
superstition to a pagan, a Jew, a Christian might be a 'rationally considered'
opinion by the holder. For 2.3,
we have some possibly analogous data--the case of the early martyrs. The
'stubbornness' of the early believers is reflective of a depth of conviction
and tenacity of belief. They died instead of recanting. This can be contrasted
with the 'mass conversion' of the Roman populace after the conversion of
Constantine. Apart from the protestations of the wealthy elite (who stood to lose
prestige/power in the deal), there doesn’t seem to be any major, large-scale
'pushback' on the part of the pagan populace. This would suggest that the
original beliefs were 'loosely held' (including any concomitant beliefs about
miracles and supernatural elements within each local mini-religion). This would
generate a differential in belief-strength between the Christian
(and Jews, also) and the general G-R pagan. For 2.4,
we have already noted (a) the existence of paradoxography; (b) the debunking
process in education (which, btw, had filtered down to all
secondary education by the middle of the first century BC--see [HEA, p.161]); (c) the cults which failed because
they were too 'absurdly monstrous'; and (d) the widespread attempts at
rationalizing their belief on the part of pagan writers. Another important
element here at 2.4 is the implicit 'canon' of the possible and the
impossible. Consider the statements by Remus [X04:PCCM, 3, 7,8]: ·
"The fact that one of the first Christian apologists, writing early
in the second century, is a pains to defend certain acts of Jesus--healings and
resurrections--implies an awareness of them as out of the ordinary and as
needing defense (Quadratus, in Eusebius, H.E. 4.3.2). Later in the same
century, the same kinds of unusual phenomena figure in Celsus' attack on
Christianity." ·
"The self-conscious use by poets of a literary device known as 'the
impossible' (adynaton) depends for its
effect on widely held canons of the possible and the impossible, the ordinary
and the extraordinary. Some such canons are implicit in the works,
current in the Greco-Roman period, consisting simply of accounts of
extraordinary phenomena. Labeled
paradoxography by modern scholars…Aulus Gellius [mid 2nd century AD]
characterizes the phenomena reports as 'unheard of'
and 'incredible,' contained in books
'full of marvels and fictions.'"
[note: if they were 'unheard of', then they were not that commonly
reported or claimed, right?] ·
"The familiar, everyday world is the background against which
such phenomena stand out
as unexpected, rare, extraordinary. That world may vary from people to
people, so that what one considers ordinary another will experience as rare and
impressive…there were canons of the ordinary among both pagans and
Christians, learned and unlearned…" (It might also be
noted that history writers knew of this 'boundary', too. They knew when they
had to appeal to eyewitness testimony for marvels, excessive
splendor, or unexpected numbers. They knew where the line was…[HI:ATAH:82-3]) In other words,
there were 'ubiquitous limits to credulity'…(smile). In addition, this
raises another interesting point: a belief that some low-level 'magical' event
could occur (i.e., fell on the 'possible' side of the canon-line) DOES NOT
IMPLY that the same person would 'automatically' be able to believe in a
miracle which would fall on the 'impossible' side. In other words, just because
someone believed a magical love spell would work (i.e., was 'possible'), does
NOT AT ALL imply that that person would/could believe that a thirty year-old
Jewish carpenter could raise the dead, feed thousands of people miraculously,
or walk on the top of water! This canon notion actually makes extrapolating
from widespread 'belief' in low-level magic, to "any-size"-spread belief in
high-level miracles of Jesus-size dubious, and something needing more
data/argument. For 2.5,
we already noted that some of the evidence of pagan 'belief' (e.g., ritual
attendance, votives, participation in events) could easily have been the simple
'default' and not at all indicative of an actual consciously-adopted
belief system. This might actually also include the magical and healing worlds,
in some cases (e.g., priesthoods, magic-dependent trades --amulet
makers, silversmiths, etc). The widespread use of amulets as 'antidotes' for
curse-spells may also fall into this category. Everybody 'feared' magical
attacks (according to the ancients), but how indicative this was of 'true
gullibility' is not immediately transparent. For 2.6, I
tend to take their statements more literally than Gager would be comfortable
with--simply because of the testimonies of those who accused others of being
(in legal proceedings) spell-casters. In other words, in the few legal
cases we have--of reputedly malicious magic--it seems that the spells/curses
were assumed to have produced those negative effects. This, of course, does not
mean that everyone (or even anyone) 'meant
that much damage', and I personally believe most magic 'attempts' fell into the
'desperation, instead of belief' category.
[One might also note, though, that some of these magical recipes for cures
(although not many exist of these, as we noted) and for love potions, could
have been understood by the ancients in ways similar to our notions of herbal
remedies and aphrodisiacs/pheromones!] For 2.7, the
accusations of 'wholesale magic' in polemical/rhetorical exchanges seems
contraindicated by the actual data. The pagans, for example, can accuse the
Jews of being the most 'magical' of the races, but actual pagan-Jewish
interactions do not seem to manifest this 'literary position': "It is
a mistake, however, to ignore the distinct settings and types of texts in which
these claims [e.g., Jews as addicted to magic] were made. It is not clear that
the daily interactions between Jews and non-Jews, especially early in our
period of interest [0-300 AD], were dominated by visions of magical Jews. The literary stereotypes do not outweigh the extensive
evidence that Jewish communities throughout the Mediterranean thrived during
this period. Those instances where there was conflict centered on other issues."
[HI:MRW, 26] But not only are
the polemical accusations of 'ethnically-ubiquitous credulity' undermined by
the historical data, but they are offset
by statements of 'ubiquitous naturalism' in some cases! Compare Philo of
Alexandria: "The view, for instance, is widely
current, that all things in the world run along
automatically, independently of anyone to guide them, and that the human mind
by itself established arts, professions, laws, customs and rules of right
treatment both of men and animals on the part of the state and in
our conduct whether as individuals or as members of communities (de. Leg. All.,
3 30 Loeb)." For 2.8,
we can see this operative at two levels. (1) the 'elite' repudiation
of 'most' of the magicians as
fraudulent (as in the pre-literate Azande culture); and (2) the failure of any
of the magicians of the day to be 'known' and/or 'accepted'. We do not have
a single accepted magician, nor do we have more than 1-2 known and unaccepted
magicians. In other words, almost all would-be magicians were unable to
'convince' large enough groups, as to ensure some trace in the literary record
(including elite, merchant, and even magical literature). This shows that the
disconnect between general credulity and specific credulity was
also operative in G-R culture, as it was in the Azande case. The net effect of this is that most
of our evidence for 'ubiquitous credulity' vanishes, or at least is rendered impotent
to support such a position. And some of the information (e.g., canons of
the possible, evidence of polemical overstatement) militates against
that position. …………………. Other
data and considerations: Outside of the NT, we might note a couple of
additional considerations: ·
We might note that when the pagans attacked the miracles of the gospels,
they did not do so by arguing that pagan miracles were 'better'
either quantitatively or qualitatively. They attempted to
discredit the miracle stories of the Christians. Had miracles (or
'believed, but fraudulent miracle claims') been so
prevalent in the pagan world, this is NOT what we would have expected.
When the pagans DID 'retort to miracle', it was (a) to either exceptionally
ancient ones or (b) to the statistically insignificant ones of the healing
shrines (as noted earlier in this series). ·
We might note that G-R accusations against the Jews assumed a 'lower
level of magical activity' among the pagans: "What
distinguished Jewish magic, at least in the minds of many people in the ancient
world, was that Jewish magicians were more
successful." [Robert Wilkin, cited in [HI:MRW,p25] ·
This is almost a theme--real magicians lived elsewhere. In other
words, "we don’t have much of that around here"--arguing that actual
personal experience of magical 'results' were very, very limited. Besides
the obvious localization of magic in Egypt, Janowitz notes a few other locales: "Thrace
was considered to be the home of many magicians, as was Thessaly, which
was notorious for its witches. The Marsi were known as 'snake-charmers'
with special cures for snakebites…" [HI:MRW,
p.13; note that this is not a very 'ubiquitous' list. The very mention of a
couple of locales as 'witch-places' exempts the rest of the world
from a high-level of 'witch production', obviously] Inside the NT, the world portrayed in the
narrative looks very much like this 'limited credulity' world. It's a world
filled with those 'so slow to believe the prophets'--the problem in the
NT is not credulity, but thick-headedness in the face of extraordinary
evidence! Let's note just a
few indications of that world from the gospels/Acts (some noted earlier in the
series on Jewish miracle working figures et al.): 1. Miracles
were expected only of non-regular persons: angels, resurrected people [Mark
6.14]. 2. The
masses were 'dull'--NOT 'suggestible'! (Mark 8.17). 3. Herod
hoped to see a miracle--apparently they were not all that common (smile)--[Lk
23.8ff]. 4. The
apostles "didn't believe the tales of the women" [Lk 24.10] 5. "Why
do doubts arise in your hearts?" said the post-resurrection, bodily Jesus!
[Lk 24.35] 6. "They
still did not believe…" [John 9 ] 7. The
(Jewish) Sadducees believed neither in spirits or angels or resurrection [Acts
23.8] The miracles of
Jesus were met with constant amazement, even by His followers. This alone would
argue for the 'uncommonness' of such experiences (and hence, the dubiousness
of claims to such by others). This last point
deserves repeating. The principle is: the fewer the number, and the less the
clarity of actual, experienced miraculous events, the greater the shock value
of an actual miracle (especially high-level ones like those of Jesus). Again, the
data within the narratives of the NT seem to bear witness to a 'mixed
credulity' world, one NOT characterized by naďve gullibility, rampant
suggestibility, and rabid credulity. Real people--in the real world,
earning real livings, and living in real families and communities--cannot
'afford' too much credulity. Charms and amulets cost money, as did medical
quacks, as did travel to healing shrines, as did offerings to the varied local
and international deities. The common family simply couldn’t afford
to be 'too superstitious'--and the possible ubiquity of the charlatan (in our
sources) was likely met with a corresponding decrease in 'credulity' (when it
had an economic cost!)… If a freedman
banker, for example, was approached by a traveling magician and was asked by
the magician to loan him a huge sum of money--claiming that he was about to
travel to Spain to force a spirit to reveal the whereabouts of a huge cache of
money, with which the banker would be repaid with interest in a year or
two--credulity could be very, very expensive… The merchant class was likely
to be the most 'jaundiced' against bogus miracle/magical claims, and it is in
this class of people in which the NT was written, transmitted, and read. [It is interesting
to note that Gager organizes the data on the Curse Tablets and Binding spells
into the follow categories: Competition in Theater and Circus; Sex, Love, and
Marriage; Legal and Political Disputes; Businesses, Shops, and Taverns; Pleas
for Justice and Revenge. Most of these are matters of the wealthy, but the
merchant-type issues ("Businesses, Shops, and Taverns") are not
reflected in the evidence of our period/geography. Gager notes: "Here it
is worth noting that all of these tablets [merchant-issues] stem from
Greece and the Greek colonies in Sicily and that their dates fall
exclusively in the classical and Hellenistic periods." [HI:CTBSAW:152] Perhaps the majority of
merchants were too money-smart to literally 'buy into' this praxis...] When we focus this data on the NT
miracle stories, several conclusions stand out: "As he often
does, Galen resembles Lucian both in tone and description. Inveighing against
the quack doctors who gain advancement while the genuine are neglected, Galen
blames 'this great and populous city,' in which such charlatans can conceal
their vices, and contrasts it with the small ones of the Greek world, in which everyone knows all
about his neighbor's culture, possessions, and character. The
wealthy of Rome honor the learned only to the extent that they can use them;
unable to bear true experts or real philosophers, they are flattered by 'poor
and uncultured' impostors who in turn are enticed by the prospect of
large profits." (Culture and Society in Lucian, C. P. Jones, p.82f) ………………………………………………………………………………. Pushback: "your comment just now
about the credibility of witnesses reminded me--when are you gonna get around
to the evidential argument of Fales? It
certainly seems intuitively true to me…" Pushy, pushy, pushy…"in your
patience possess ye your soul"… I hate to disappoint you, but it's not
really that big of a deal… Here is his statement: "The issue is evidential: given
that so many are fabricated, what reason do we
have to believe those of the home religion?" If we work "backward" through
it, we can see the simplicity of the counter-argument. First, the apodosis (smile):
"what reason do we have to believe those
[claims to miracle] of the home religion?" The answer is
surprisingly simple: the same reason we have to
believe ANY miracle report--the credibility of the 'reporter'. If I had grown up
with Simon Peter, and been a partner in his commercial fishing venture, I would
have a fair assessment of any propensity on his part to "irresponsibly
embrace the absurd"…I would want, of course, to hear and see him tell the
story HIMSELF, to judge his non-verbals etc., but his credibility with me
is a function of his history with me.
It is not a
function of my history with other people making similar or analogous
claims. The two cases are altogether unrelated. If, on the other
hand, my friend Simon Peter had consistently brought me stories which later
consistently turned out to be bogus, then Fales is entirely correct in his
insinuation--I wouldn't have any good reasons to accept the
latest-and-greatest 'fish story' from Peter. But if Simon seems
to be the 'same old Simon', and the story is told simply and with his own
amazement at the difficulty of the subject, then I would likely trust him
(assuming a long history of trust, of course, and no indications of recent
'negative' changes on his part). This credibility
might also actually be enhanced if the event Simon narrates to me as an
eyewitness/participant is altogether unlike
any of the bogus low-level magical claims I hear every time I go
grocery shopping in the market. Every week when I go to the marketplace, there
seems to be a new traveling quack, selling "love spells" and/or ways to "sink the competitors'
boats" or spells to locate lost articles. These types don't do very well
in our little town, since they are not known and trusted. These low-level and
sometimes petty (and often malicious) effects they promise are so
radically different from the beneficial and/or exalted miracles of
which Simon Peter speaks, that I am not likely to even connect the two, or to
put them in the same category of 'wonders'. So, the reason for accepting
a report is largely dependent on the credibility of the reporter (especially in
relation to the hearer). This is a one-on-one function, and is not affected by
environmental variables, so to speak. Next, the protasis: "given that so many are fabricated…" We can already see how this
is going to be irrelevant to our decision (in this context). As long as the
'fabricated many' are not fabricated by the 'home reporter' (i.e., Simon), then
the lies of the many cannot change my estimate of my trusted friend
Simon. And, as noted above,
if the 'so many' are not even instances of the same types of claim
(e.g., 'promises to perform love spells' versus eyewitness report of
multiplication of the loaves and fishes to feed a crowd), this is additionally
irrelevant to my assessment of Simon's story. (Remember, we haven’t had any
"Jesus-size" miracle claims for at least 400 years before His life in
Palestine.) There just is no direct connection between the false
testimony of others and the testimony of my trusted friend Simon. Strictly speaking, we should also
note that the principle of "the more liars there are, the less we should
believe anyone" is not technically true. The principle would actually need
to be refined to something more like "the more liars there are, the more
we should qualify our witness before we believe him/her" (a basic
juridical/evidential principle). Once I have 'qualified' Simon Peter through a
lifetime of credibility-building interactions, I am 'free' to believe him as
much as I want…or until he changes (for the worse). So, I don't find the evidential
problem to be a real one…once you look at how credibility of reports generally
work, it seems to magically disappear (smile)… Therefore, I don't see adequate
reason to reduce the evidential value of the gospel miracles stories, due to
some alleged 'ubiquitous credulity' of the ancient world. Glenn Miller Dec 5, 2002
B. A quick discussion of
Richard's examples
But the examples of 'sincerity' he gives are almost without exception post-NT…
Situating the NT miracle stories within this credulity context…
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